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Abstract
This thesis applies agency theory to design risk regulatory policies in the implemen-
tation of sustainable sea defences. The aim is to investigate methods to reduce the
probability of an accident inflicted on the society by resolving a downstream and an
upstream moral hazard problem existing in engineering problems with an emphasis on
the construction of sustainable sea defences.
The risk regulation aims at reducing the probability of damage cost associated with
flooding by enhancing an operator’s safety operational procedures. It is defined by
three policies; a safety design, a transfer payment, and a fine. In the downstream
moral hazard between an operator and a regulator, a risk neutral operator under full
liability will implement a sea defence which is optimal from the regulator’s point of
view when a fine is set equal to damage cost without a cost for the regulator.
However, if the operator has limited assets to cover the damage cost, a cap on the
operator’s fine is placed to take into account that an operator may default if damage
costs are too high. Limiting the responsibility of the operator in case of an accident
decreases the strength of the incentive mechanism leading to the implementation of a
sea defence below the socially optimum. This second best height of the sea defence
involves an informational cost to the society in the form of a liability rent to guarantee
the participation of the operator in the engineering project. The more we make the
operator liable for the damage cost, the higher the liability rent. The society faces a
trade off between liability rent and residual risk. The higher the residual risk, the lower
the liability rent.
Unlike the limited liability case, an operator with averse attitude to uncertain pay-
offs will implement a sea defence higher than a risk neutral operator in order to reduce
the weight on the upper extreme values of the tail of the fine. This is because the
marginal fine decreases under risk aversion. Similarly to the limited liability case, the
implementation of a second best height of the sea defence is not free for the society.
The society will have to compensate the operator for participating in the project in the
presence of uncertain payoffs. This compensation takes the form of a risk premium and
is subject to the risk coefficient and the variance of the damage cost distribution.
Due to the lack of regulatory quality and independence, a pro-industry regulator
and a government may have conflicting interest about the fine cap to impose to the
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operator. While the regulator prefers a higher fine cap to induce a higher liability
rent, the government seeks to impose a lower fine cap. The government faces a trade
off problem between how much discretion should be given up and how much expert
information should be used from the regulator. In the case when the government
observes that any of the fine cap choices available to the regulator is higher than its
ex-ante choice of the fine cap, no discretion will be granted because the cost to the
society outweighs the benefits of using the regulator’s expertise. Nevertheless, when
the government observes that some of the fine cap choices available to the regulator are
lower than its ex-ante choice of the fine cap some level of discretion can be granted. The
limit on the fine caps that the regulator can announce is determined by how much the
regulator is biased towards the interests of the nuclear industry. When the regulator’s
range of fine caps is optimally restricted, the objectives of the regulator and the operator
will be aligned by encouraging the regulator to choose a fine cap that will not exceed
the optimal fine cap of the government.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The implementation of complex engineering projects such as the construction of sus-
tainable sea defences creates a large number of interrelated risks affecting everything
from technical feasibility to cost. The complexity of these projects requires a multidis-
ciplinary approach to secure a robust balance among all parties in view of sharing risk
and benefits.
Benefits and risks associated with large energy projects have to be considered from
an economic, an environmental, an engineering and a societal point of view. A typical
large civil engineering project requires the engagement of a large number of stakeholders
such as developers, designers, builders, suppliers, regulators, and government adminis-
trative departments. The four main stakeholders in energy projects of most democracies
are the parliament or the congress or the legislature, the society, a regulatory authority,
and an operator.
The role of the parliament is to approve the bill introduced by the government before
it becomes an Act of Parliament. The government will be responsible for contracting the
industry to implement the project. Regulatory authorities including advisory bodies
are commissioned by the government to conduct supervision and management of the
project.
As a result of contractual relationships among the government, the regulatory au-
thority and the industry, asymmetric information problems arise. The nature of this
informational asymmetry can be thought as the industry’s ability, quality, technology,
equipment, management and services at the bidding stage and as the quality of the
personnel, the quality of the materials, the construction methods and their technol-
ogy at the performance stage. The regulatory authority cannot observe with certainty
whether the contract has been strictly followed or the industry has shirked from the
binding agreement.
An example of this information failure is the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant accident. On March 2011, the Tohoko-oki earthquake with a magnitude 9.0
shook north-eastern Japan, unleashing a savage tsunami [38]. The 15-meter tsunami
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Figure 1.1: Information diagram.
hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disabling the power supply and heat
sinks, thereby triggering a nuclear accident [39].
The findings of the reports carried out by The Japanese Nuclear Accident Investi-
gation Commission, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The European
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission concur that the im-
plementation of optimal safety design parameters, plant elevation, seawall elevation
and location and status of a back-up generator, could have mitigated or prevented the
catastrophic consequences of the tsunami [1, 19, 36, 37].
TEPCO, for example, had insisted that Fukushima Daiichi’s 5.7m seawall was high
enough to withstand a tsunami generated by a large quake in the area, despite a warning
in 2008 by its own engineers that much bigger waves were possible. TEPCO’s officials
in charge of disaster planning chose to ignore the best practices promulgated by the
International Atomic Energy Association and the Japan Society of Civil Engineering by
dismissing such evidence pertaining to the implementation of safety design parameters
below the optimum. Furthermore, some irregularities in the risk assessment methodol-
ogy were flagged in several official Fukushima accident reports, pointing out that these
models omitted variables of paramount importance such as the hydrodynamic forces of
a tsunami and the effects of debris and sediment in the height of the tsunami run up
[1].
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In addition to the presence of information asymmetry between the stakeholders,
there are upper bounds on damage costs that operators can cover for harm inflicted
on third parties or on the environment. Economics refers to this as limited liability.
Limited liability enables operator’s shirk costs of an accident beyond the value of its
net assets; this implies that beyond that point society will be responsible for any excess
damage cost.
TEPCO’s limited liability and the lack of incentives to address residual risk such as
that of low probability tsunamis led TEPCO to ignore its safety responsibilities.
In the presence of limited liability and the existence of asymmetric information,
operators face wrong incentives when making decisions on safety imposing a risk of
catastrophic damages on the society which does not earn a contractual return for bear-
ing that risk.
Moreover, the existence of conflicting objectives between the regulator and the
parliament deriving from regulator’s lack of independence and regulator’s privileged
information with respect to some parameters affecting the damage cost triggers an
upstream moral hazard problem. This upstream moral hazard deters the regulator
from asserting its authority to make rules, properly reviewing simulations conducted
by the operator and fostering the development of appropriate computer modelling tools.
The Japanese regulator’s interest in relaxing international safety regulations on the
operator may be due to the lack of independence of the Japanese Nuclear and Industry
Safety Agency (NISA) from the ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s Agency
for Natural Resources and Economy, the government body responsible for promoting
nuclear power. Indeed, the regulator’s independence can be compromised by three
threats. Firstly, there is a risk that the regulated parties may try to capture the
regulators, e.g.; by bribing them or by promising them well-paid jobs in the future, in
order to influence their decisions [28, 33, 34]. Secondly, there is a risk that the industry
uses asymmetric information and misinformation to manipulate the regulator [29].
Finally, there is a risk that the regulator’s independence is compromised by the
regulator’s private interest in the sector, directly or indirectly, e.g., when the regulator
holds stocks in a unit trust investing in the regulated industry [20].
Moreover, in some countries energy regulators may be pro-industry bias due too
the close relationships with politicians. Those politicians in turn, tends to promote the
interest of regulated energy operators [33, 34].
Thus, a critical issue is how, if at all, the regulator can best induce the regulated
operator to employ its privileged information to further the broad interests of society,
rather than to pursue its own interests and how the government can do the same with
the regulator.
This thesis proposes a game-theoretic approach in the principal and agent frame-
work to introduce incentive regulatory policies written as contracts that compensate
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the operator based on the quality of the performance in the construction of a sea de-
fence to protect energy critical infrastructure. The thesis borrows, and builds on from
Hiriart and Martimort (2012). They were the first to present the delegation problem
to design risk regulatory policies. They also characterize the optimal interval delega-
tion sets following Holmstrom’s pioneering work. Holmstrom states that an optimal
delegation set is determined by how much the agent’s payoff function diverges from
principal’s payoff function. This is where the ally principle holds: The more aligned
are the payoff functions, the more authority is granted to the regulator [12]. Unlike
Hiriart and Martimort’s model where the equilibrium is analysed from a single point in
time, the model presented in this thesis is intertemporal. The impacts of the operator’s
decisions are assessed over lengthy periods of time.
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters: Chapter 3 introduces the elements of the
economic model. Chapter 4 explores the optimal regulatory policies under full, limited
liability, and risk aversion. Chapter 5 characterizes the set of transfers available to the
regulator to impose risk regulatory policies on the operator. And finally, chapter 6
draws some conclusions from the previous chapters.
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Chapter 2
Review of related literature
Traditional methods of regulation such as Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, marginal cost pric-
ing, non-linear pricing, and the cost service regulation neglect the role of asymmetric
information and incentive problems with regards to the technology, costs and consumer
demand attributes facing the firms they regulate [8, 6, 7]. However, fully informed regu-
lators is not a very realistic assumption. The regulated firm may find more profitable to
exert too little safety effort to control the cost of running a power plant, increasing the
potential realization of damage cost in case of an accident [26]. This is due to the fact
that regulated firms have incentives to exploit their information advantage to extract
profits by avoiding the cost of certain measures that may be vital to prevent harm to
the society [28]. Incentive regulation has replaced rate of return regulation as the norm
in many industries [32]. Incentive regulation can be defined as the implementation of
rules that encourage a regulator firm to achieve desired goals by granting some, but
not complete, discretion to the firm. The regulated firm is granted some discretion
under incentive regulation. This feature of incentive regulation distinguishes it from
command and control regulation, the regulator would specify the exact changes in op-
erating procedures that the firm must undertake in an attempt to reduce the operating
costs [32]. Furthermore, the regulator imposes checks and limits on relevant activities
and/or outcome under incentive regulation. There are two reasons why the regulated
firm is granted some, but not complete, discretion under incentive regulation. First,
the firm has better information than the regulator about key aspects of the regulated
industry. These aspects can include the firm’s actions, its production technology (or
cost structure), and customer preferences. Second, the firm’s goals differ from those of
consumers or society at large [20, 21, 22].
The development of contract theory, and information economics has provided the
tools with which to address informational constraints problems in theoretical models
of regulation. The main advantage of using game theory and principal-agent models
in regulatory economics is that a strategic situation can be described as an optimal
contract by choosing an appropriate model which delivers the desirable outcome [28, 24,
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25]. Principal and agent relationship typically involve three types of partially conflicting
objectives: risk must be distributed, appropriate effort levels must be induced (moral
hazard), and truthful information must be elicited (adverse selection). For example,
the moral hazard literature has focused on the trade off between incentives for effort
and risk sharing. One of the main results shows that agents must bear more risk than
in the first best, to induce reasonable effort level subject to the risk attitude of the
agent.On the other hand, the adverse selection literature has studied how a principal
should structure his offer of contracts to a privately informed agent, to optimize his own
objective under the interim participation constraint of the agent. An informational rent
must be given up by the principal to all types except the less efficient ones [24, 25, 28].
Laffont and Rochet explores a situation with both adverse selection and moral hazard
for a risk averse agent, in which the contract is offered and signed before the agent
knows his type. Since the principal is risk neutral and the agent risk averse, the
optimal contract will involve some insurance-incentive trade off.
In most of the literature, the goal of the regulator is to maximize the social welfare
function by restricting the rents transferred from the society to the operator subject to
the participation constraint [21]. The regulator’s objective function is modelled as the
weighted sum of the society’s and operator’s objective function. The regulator places
more weight on the society’s surplus than on the rents earned by the operator [3]. This
can be interpreted as the higher the rent left to the operator, the lower the regulator’s
payoff because the increase in the transfer payment. Furthermore, the cost of raising
funds from taxpayers is captured by introducing the parameter Λ = 0 [3]. In this
formulation, taxpayers welfare is presumed to decline by 1 + Λ euros for each euro of
tax revenue the government collects. The parameter Λ, often called the social cost of
public funds, is strictly positive when taxes distort productive activity (reducing effort
or inducing wasteful effort to avoid taxes, for example), and thereby create deadweight
losses. The parameter Λ is viewed as exogenous in the regulated industry [3]. The
literature generally adopts one of two approaches. The first approach introduced by
Baron and Myerson (1982), assumes that the regulator strictly prefers society surplus
to operator’s rent by setting α < 1 and that there is no any social cost of public funds
by setting Λ = 0 [5]. The second approach, which follows Laffont and Tirole (1986),
assumes that the regulator equally prefers the society surplus and the operator’s rent
by setting α = 1 and strictly positive social cost of public funds Λ > 0 [26]. The central
difference between the two basic approaches concerns the transfer payments that are
optimal when the regulator and the operator are both perfectly informed about the sea
defence implemented and the potential damage cost is case of accident [3].
Thus, bearing in mind the existence of uncertainty as a result of information asym-
metry, the social welfare maximizing regulator will seek a regulatory mechanism that
takes both the social costs of adverse selection and moral hazard into account, subject
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to the firm participation or budget balance constraint that it faces, balancing the costs
associated with adverse selection and the costs associated with moral hazard [22].
We are concerned with the body of the literature focused on adverse selection and
moral hazard motivated by the assumption that regulators can observe the realization
of damage cost ex post and has also knowledge about the probability distribution of
the damage cost ex ante. In addition, the effort exerted by the firm determines the
potential damage cost but it is not observable by the regulator [26].
Although, most of the incentive regulation literature is static. Some researches have
considered the issues associated with the dynamic interactions between the regulator
and the regulated firm. As the relation prolongates over time, the regulator has more
capacity to reduce its informational disadvantage. The observable realization of damage
cost in the first period enables the regulator to gain more information on the effort
implemented. This information update can be utilized to renegotiate the terms of the
contract ex-post [4, 27].
Another extension of the canonical agency model is the introduction of higher di-
mensions. In that context, the regulator explores the incentive regulatory mechanism
when a firm is expected to distribute her effort over different tasks. Increasing the
incentive for one task could cause a contractor to devote too much time to that task
neglecting the others [17].
Another strand of the literature relevant to the model in this thesis is that related to
environments where limitations are imposed on the maximum fine that can be imposed
to risk neutral firm with the main purpose of protecting firms from going bankrupt in
case of an accident. Several author examines how liability constraint determines the
rent left to the firm under moral hazard [31, 18, 15, 14].
A critical issue is how the parliament can make the most of regulator’s expert infor-
mation by granting some authority without compromising the interest of the society.
There are two major strands of delegation models in the framework of game theory;
the delegation of authority game and the signalling game[13].
In this thesis we consider the first class of models. The parliament considers the
delegation of authority for implementing regulatory policies to a regulatory body in
order to take advantage of her knowledge and expertise. If the regulator is granted
authority, then he can use his knowledge to gather information about the parameters
of the damage cost function before he chooses the safety design parameter based on the
potential damage cost. On the contrary, if delegation is not granted, the parliament
must decide the acceptable level of residual risk in the face of uncertainty of the damage
cost function parameters[16].
When the parliament enables the regulator to make a choice within a set of damage
cost, the optimal delegation sets takes the form of a single interval if the regulator’s
payoff is similar to the parliament’s payoff [2].
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Chapter 3
The economic model
We consider the relationship between the parliament, a regulatory agency, and an
operator in the implementation of sustainable sea defences to protect society from
flooding associated with natural hazards.
This economic model has six main features.
1. An operator maintains a contract with the government that covers those disasters
caused by events like earthquakes and tsunamis [30]. This contract takes into
account that an operator has not sufficient solvency to fully compensate society
for the damage cost in case of flooding of energy critical infrastructure.
2. The regulator cannot perfectly evaluate the effectiveness of the safety parameters
chosen by the operator, because there is a positive cost of monitoring operator’s
parameters [10]. The survival of a sea defence due to an earthquake depends on
how the ground moves. That movement depends on the earthquake’s magnitude,
the direction, the depth, the quality of local soil. The structural damage depends
on the peak ground acceleration, the duration of any acceleration and the fre-
quency of the shock waves. These factors determine the engineering safety design
parameters to be implemented by the operator. The safety design parameters
include the materials in the composition of cement, the thickness of the seawall,
etc.
3. The combination of limited liability and asymmetric information results in regu-
latory failure. This regulatory failure is of the form of a downstream moral hazard
where the operator may act in her own benefit to the detriment of the society.
4. The regulator is dominated by the energy industry implementing policies that are
pro-operator.
5. The regulator possesses valuable information about the parameters determining
the damage cost in case of flooding.
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6. The government cannot evaluate whether the policies implemented are the most
appropriate in light of the information possessed by the regulator. This triggers
an upstream moral hazard between a regulator and the parliament.
The aim of this economic model is to design an incentive contract to reduce the vul-
nerability of a critical infrastructure facility. The economic model can be summarized
by three variables:
1. the sea defence implemented by the operator denoted by a which is determined
by the safety design parameter k,
2. a natural hazard h˜ which is modelled as a random variable, and
3. the outcome of the implementation of a sea defence is the probability of a damage
cost as a result of a flooding and is denoted by D˜.
Throughout the model it is assumed that the function to reduce the vulnerability
of a critical infrastructure facility is D˜ = b(h˜− a) where b is the cost parameter.
3.1 Principal and agent theory
The agency relationship is defined as one in which one or more persons named the
principal delegate some decision making authority to the agent to carry out some eco-
nomic activities or services on their behalf. The terms of the relationship between the
government, a regulator, and an operator are determined by a contract given assump-
tions about people, organizations, information [11]. The principles of agency theory
are presented in Table 3.1.
The cornerstone of agency theory is the presence of asymmetric information which
is the source of uncertainty in the outcome of the model. Because the unit of analysis
is the contract governing the relationship between the regulator and the operator, the
focus of this thesis is on determining the most efficient form of contract.
3.1.1 Contracts
The contract can be thought of as a labour income and is of the linear form I = T−F˜ (a)
where T is a fixed payment transfer payment and F˜ (a) is a fine which is proportional to
the damage cost D˜(a). The fine increases with the damage cost which in turn, decreases
with the safety design parameter.
Linear contracts are simple to analyze, are observed in some real-world settings,
and have the appealing property of creating uniform incentives.
The economic variables of the contract considered in this model are the potential
damage cost D˜ inflicted on the society, the payment transfer of the operator T granted
by society and the fine charged to the operator in case of an accident F˜ .
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Table 3.1: Overview of the components of the Agency theory.
Components of Agency Theory Description
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient
organization of information and risk-bearing costs
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent
Human self-interest assumptions Self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency
as the effectiveness criterion and information
asymmetry between principal and agent
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity
Contracting problems Contracting Agency (moral hazard and
adverse selection), risk sharing and limited liability
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent
have partly differing goals and risk preferences
Let be A the set of feasible allocations. Formally, we have
A = (D˜, T, F˜ ) : D ∈ R+, T ∈ R+, F ∈ R+. (3.1)
These variables are both observable and verifiable by the regulatory agency and
society. They can thus be included in a contract which can be enforced with appropriate
penalties if the operator deviates from the requested sea defence.
3.1.2 Objective functions
Given a contract, the government, the regulator, an operator, and the society can eval-
uate which damage cost outcome inflicted by the operator’s implemented sea defence
is preferable in light with the payoff yielded as a result. In this model, the payoff of the
government, the regulator, an operator, and the society is determined by the following
payoff functions.
The operator’s payoff function is
P˜O = T − ϕ(k)− F˜ . (3.2)
This payoff is a function of the safety design parameter k, a transfer payment T ,
and a fine F˜ . The operator’s cost of implementing k is determined by the cost function
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ϕ(k). We assume that the cost function ϕ(k) is strictly increasing in k, ϕ′ > 0, and
convex ϕ′′ ≥ 0 .
The society’s pay-off function is
P˜S = S − T − D˜ + F˜ . (3.3)
This payoff is a function of the revenue S, the transfer payment T , the damage cost
D˜, and the fine F˜ . The society receives a revenue S from the operator’s implemented
sea defence and the society pays a transfer payment T to the operator in exchange for
his protective measures.
The regulatory agency wants to enhance the social welfare by maximizing the
weighted sum of the society’s payoff and the operator’s payoff, where the weight param-
eter 0 ≤ αR ≤ 1 is the value the regulator assigns to the operator’s payoff in relation
to the payoff of the society.
The regulator’s payoff function is then the weighted sum P˜R = P˜S + αRP˜O and is
conveniently rewritten as
P˜R = S − ϕ(k)− D˜ − (1− αR)P˜O. (3.4)
The government’s payoff function is also the weighted sum P˜G = P˜S +αGP˜O where
parliament’s weight parameter 0 ≤ αG ≤ αR ≤ 1, yielding
P˜G = S − ϕ(k)− D˜ − (1− αG)P˜O. (3.5)
3.1.3 The sequence of actions
The elements of the model can be represented in a game theoretical setting as presented
in Figure 3.1.
The sequence of actions is as follows.
• Time 0 The regulator offers a contract to the operator before the realization of the
damage cost in case of an accident is known (ex-ante) which has been previously
agreed with the government. This ex-ante contract compensates the operator for
implementing sea defences to protect society from accidents associated with natu-
ral hazards. The regulator is better informed than the government with respect to
the parameters that determine the damage cost. This private information, held
by the regulator, leads to an upstream moral hazard problem. The upstream
moral hazard is the first source of uncertainty of the damage cost output.
• Time 1 The operator can reject or accept the contract if the participation constraint
is satisfied.
• Time 2 Once the contract is signed, the operator implements a sea defence that
reduces the probability of an accident and maximises her payoff. The operator
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Figure 3.1: Game theoretical representation of the economic model.
faces a cost of implementing a safety design parameter k in the interval k = [0, k¯].
This safety design parameter k determines the quality of the seawall a. The safety
design parameter k is chosen on the basis of a risk assessment. As the regulator
can not observe the quality of the sea defence implemented by the operator k
a downstream moral hazard problem is unfolded. The moral hazard problem is
the second source of uncertainty in the outcome of the model. The outcome of
the implemented sea defence is an stochastic damage cost outcome. The damage
cost is stochastic because it is a function of the height of the tsunami run up
h which is modelled as a random variable. The link between the safety design
parameter and damage cost distribution can be seen as follows; damage cost is
a random variable and its probability distribution depends on the safety design
parameter carried out by the operator. So, for instance, an operator could reduce
the vulnerability by exerting a higher safety design parameter but she still faces
risk because the performance measure is only stochastically related to the safety
design parameter. In this view, the operator takes her safety design parameter
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before knowing the realization of the damage cost.
• Time 3 Once the realization of the damage cost is known after an accident, the
ex-post payoffs of the government, the regulator and the operator are revealed.
3.1.4 Moral hazard
The implementation of a sea defence by an operator, which is determined by the safety
design parameter k ∈ [0, k¯], reduces the probability of damage cost imposed to the
society in case of an accident. The implementation of a sea defence entails a monetary
cost for the operator which is given by a cost function ϕ(k). The cost function ϕ(k) is
common knowledge and satisfy the Inada conditions:
• the value of the function at 0 is zero, ϕ(0) = 0,
• the function is strictly increasing in a, ϕ′(k) > 0,
• the derivative of the function is decreasing so that the function is strictly concave,
ϕ′′(k) < 0,
• the limit of the derivative approaches zero when a goes to zero, lim ϕ′(k) = 0
when k 7→ 0, and
• The limit of the derivative approaches plus infinity when k goes to plus infinity,
lim ϕ′(k) = +∞ when k 7→ +∞.
The effectiveness of the sea defence is not observable by either the regulator or the
society. Thus, moral hazard might increase the vulnerability of the critical infrastruc-
ture by raising the residual risk.
3.1.5 Participation and incentive constraints
When the regulator can not observe the quality of the sea defence implemented by
the operator, the regulator can only provide incentives to encourage the operator to
implement the optimal quality of the sea defence. From section 3.1.1, we noticed that
the incentive takes the form of a fine F˜ (a) imposed to the operator as function of the
operator’s implemented sea defence a.
When the operator has aversion to risk and/or limited assets to compensate the
society in case of an accident, the regulator can not do better than a second best
contract which satisfies the participation and incentive constraints of the operator. A
second best contract implies that the optimal sea defence can not be implemented due
to the existence of random damage cost outcomes. However, when the operator shows
a risk neutral attitude to uncertain damage cost outcomes and has sufficient assets to
cover the damage cost incurred, the regulator can achieve a first best contract which
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results in the implementation of optimal sea defences despite the existence of random
damage cost outcomes.
The participation constraint states that given an implemented sea defence, an op-
erator will demand a expected payoff from the implementation of sea defences that is
at least equal to the value of the assets that she is able to use to cover excess damage
cost.
Ti − E[F (h˜, ai)]− ϕ(ki) > 0 = p0 (3.6)
where p0 is the value of the assets.
The incentive compatibility constraint states that an optimal contract must be that
the increase in the operator’s expected payoff is higher when the operator implements
a better quality sea defence than when she implements a lower quality sea defence.
Tj − E[F (h˜, aj)]− ϕ(kj) > Ti − E[F (h˜, ai)]− ϕ(ki) (3.7)
where aj > ai.
The incentive compatibility constraint depends only on the relative level (or marginal
increase in the transfer payment) of the transfer payment for each expected damage cost
outcome, while the participation constraint depends on the absolute payment transfer
(the total increase in the payment transfer) for each expected damage cost outcome.
In light of this , if the constraints were not binding, the regulator can decrease the
level of payment transferred for each realization of the tsunami run up height without
affecting the relative (resp. absolute) level of the transfer payment, thereby satisfying
both constraints at lower cost for the society.
3.1.6 Informational rent
As the contractable variable damage cost D˜ is stochastic and determines the payoff
of the stakeholder, the optimal transfer payment allocated to the operator is distorted
from the optimal transfer payment under incomplete information. This distortion is
contingent on the risk attitude of the stakeholder with respect to uncertain payoffs.
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, stakeholders are indifferent between earning
the same payoff through the stochastic payoff or sure payoffs, implying that informa-
tional rents are not necessary to recover efficiency. Nevertheless, risk averse stakeholders
value the payoff less as the upper bound of the potential damage cost increases. There-
fore, an informational rent will be included to the transfer payment to account for this
loss in value.
The size of the informational rent is not only dependent upon the aversion of the
stakeholder towards risk but also on the assets available to the operator to compensate
for any harm inflicted to the society. Under limited liability, the regulator gives up
some rent to the operator to guarantee a non negative payoff for all realizations of
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damage cost. This protects the society from paying the damage cost in case of accident
if the damage cost exceeds the operator’s resources.
3.1.7 First-Order stochastic dominance
The cumulative distribution function H of the damage cost D˜ is induced by h˜ and the
sea defence a.
It is an assumption of the model that the cumulative distribution function H(D˜, ai)
that is contingent on the sea defence ai, first-order stochastically dominates the cumu-
lative distribution function H(D˜, aj) that is contingent on aj , whenever ai < aj . In
order words, the higher the sea defence, the lower the damage cost. First-Order dom-
inance means that for any value of the damage cost, the probability is higher under
the cumulative distribution function H(D˜, ai) than under the cumulative distribution
function H(D˜, aj). The cumulative distribution function H(D˜, ai) yields a lower payoff
for the operator for each realization of the tsunami run up height than the cumulative
density function H(D˜, aj) whenever ai < aj .
3.1.8 Limited liability
The use of limits to liability is particularly justified in situations of moral hazard. The
fact that implementing sea defences leads to stochastic payoffs could deter many op-
erators from entering into contracts and probably be detrimental to economic activity.
This is because spending resources on protection against natural hazards does not guar-
antee a positive outcome for every realization of the natural hazard as there will be
always a residual risk.
Society can not deal with bankrupt operators because it will bear all excess cost.
It is better to take into account bankruptcies by including a liability constraint. Two
main forms of limited liability have been identified. The first form guarantees a certain
level of payoff (or utility) and the second one guarantees a certain level of transfer
payment (or fine).
A limited liability constraint on transfers can, in general, be interpreted as a re-
sult of the government’s limited financial resources to compensate the operator for
implementing sea defences; while the constraint on payoff corresponds to a minimum
level of well-being of the operator[31]. The model proposed in this thesis guarantees a
non-negative payoff of the operator for every potential realization of the damage cost.
The constraint on payoff or utility can also approximate a situation of extreme risk
aversion beyond a certain level of damage cost. It is plausible that an operator may
be unaffected by the uncertainty of the payoff but as the variance of the damage cost
distribution increases may become concerned with the realization of extremely high
damage cost .
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3.2 Delegation theory
The government delegates to a regulator the task of imposing the contract on the op-
erator. However, the regulator is better informed than the government about some
parameters determining the damage cost outcome in case of accident. This informa-
tional asymmetry may lead to an upstream moral hazard problem if there exist a
conflict of interest between the government and the regulator. The design of delegation
mechanisms play an important role to minimize the negative effects of the upstream
moral hazard. [13].
There are two major delegation models in the agency theoretical framework.
1. In the first class of models, the government considers the delegation of authority
for implementing regulatory policies to a regulator in order to take advantage of her
knowledge and expertise [2, 12].
If the regulator is granted discretion, then she can use his knowledge to gather
information about the magnitude of the potential damage cost. On the contrary, if
delegation is not granted, the parliament must decide the sea defence to implement in
the face of uncertainty of the magnitude of the potential damage cost [2, 12].
2. In this second class of models, the sequence of actions start with a regulator who
uses his knowledge to gather information about the magnitude of the potential damage
cost and reports to the government. The government then processes the information
provided and chooses a sea defence to implement. These are called signalling models.
If the information with regards to the potential damage cost sent to the government
does not require any informational rent, then it is a cheap-talk model [2, 12].
The model presented in this thesis belongs to the first class of models.
3.2.1 Delegation problem
The government has to make a decision about the quality of the sea defence to be
implemented under uncertainty of the magnitude of the potential damage cost in case
of flooding. The government has available a regulator whom it may consult in the
process of making a decision because the regulator possess some relevant information
about the cost and benefit analysis of the optimal policy or the cost parameters that
determines the damage cost. The problem the government faces in using a regulator is
that the regulator may have different objectives that the parliament. This conflict of
interest may derive from the lack of independence of the regulator. Thus, the problem
lies on the designing of a delegation mechanism that facilitates the use of regulator’s
knowledge without compromising the viability of the project by benefiting the regulator
or the operator to detriment of the society.
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3.2.2 Contract direct mechanism
A mechanism comprises the following elements:
• there are two stakeholders: the government and the regulator,
• the government does not have private information. The regulator has private
information of the cost parameter b ∈ B which determines the damage cost func-
tion. b can be considered as a growth factor in the damage cost function and is
drawn from a commonly known distribution,
• a set of potential damage cost values D˜,
• the objective function of the regulator when the regulator announces parameter
bˆ which may be different from the true parameter b and obtains a realization
damage D˜
E[PR] = S − δfb
∫ ∞
a(k(bˆ))
(h− a(k(bˆ)))f(h)dh− c2k
2(bˆ)− (1− αR)(R(k(bˆ))),
• and the objective function for the government
E[PG] = S − δfb
∫ ∞
a(k(bˆ))
(h− a(k(bˆ)))f(h)dh− c2k
2(bˆ)− (1− αG)(R(k(bˆ))).
From our setting we can distinguished two conceptual issues.
First, there is an information extraction problem; how can the government find out
about the regulator’s true cost parameter?
Second, there is a contracting problem; how many different contracts (one contract
for each different quality of the sea defence implemented) should the government
allow the regulator to impose on the operator?
A fundamental result in contract theory is the Revelation Principle. It says that we
can simplify the contracting problem substantially.
The revelation principle guarantees that there is no loss of generality in restricting
the parliament to offer as many contracts as many options as the cardinality of the cost
parameter space B. The cost parameter space B is specified in the interval [b, b¯] and
represents the private information of the regulator.
A direct mechanism is a specification of the cost parameter space of the regulator
B and a damage cost function that maps the regulator’s announcement of the damage
growth parameter bˆ into an optimal sea defence and an optimal transfer payment. In
order words, the mechanism stipulates the range of possible transfer payments available
to the regulator. In line with this specification, the government can set restrictions of
the transfer payment to be paid to the operator.
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3.2.3 Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
In contractual relationships where the information available to the government is in-
complete, the mechanism combined with the cost parameter space b ∈ B and density
pi(b) defines a Bayesian game with possibly different payoffs structure for every b ∈ B.
In Bayesian games it is useful to distinguish between stages of the contractual
relationship in terms of the knowledge sets of the regulator. The three stages of a
Bayesian game are ex ante, interim, and ex post. The ex ante stage is before the cost
parameter b is drawn from the distribution pi(b). In the ex ante stage the regulator
and the government know this distribution pi(b) but no the actual cost parameter. The
interim stage is immediately after the regulator finds out the actual cost parameter,
but before the realization of a damage cost. The government knows the distribution
pi(b). In the ex post stage the actual cost parameter is known by the regulator and
the government after a realization of a damage cost. The proposed model is considered
from an interim stage.
A solution to a Bayesian game is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is defined as the government’s beliefs about the actual cost parameter
of the regulator that maximizes the regulator’s expected payoff. In a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium the regulator has not incentive to announce a different cost parameter from
the actual parameter.
Importantly, throughout in the Bayesian game, the possible sea defences, the pay-
off functions, possible cost parameters, and the probability distribution over the cost
parameter are assumed to be known by both the regulator and the government.
The mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if the regulator yields a higher
payoff by announcing the true cost parameter in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
An incentive compatible mechanism has to satisfy two conditions: the truth telling
condition and the monotonicity condition.
1. Truth telling condition implies that the true cost parameter yields the highest
payoff to the regulator.
2. Monotonicity condition implies that, as the cost parameter increases, the opera-
tor’s optimal sea defence also increases.
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Chapter 4
Risk regulatory policy
4.1 Risk neutrality and full liability
A risk-neutral operator has a constant marginal utility of payoff. Marginal utility is
the change in total satisfaction for the operator from increasing the quality of the sea
defence a. With a constant marginal utility of payoff a risk-neutral operator values a
sure payoff of some amount exactly as much as it values a gamble that has 50 chance
of paying twice that amount and a 50 chance of paying nothing at all. The expected
utility of the stochastic damage cost is equal to the utility of the expectation of the
stochastic damage cost.
u(E[P˜O(T, δf , a)]) = E(u[P˜O(T, δf , a)]). (4.1)
The preference of a risk-neutral operator over the expected damage cost can be
represented by a linear function. The slope of the line is the same at all levels of the
payoff.
4.1.1 Optimal risk regulatory policy under full liability
We consider a risk-neutral operator who cares about the expected damage cost only
and no about the variance of the damage cost. Because F˜ = δf D˜, δf is the proportional
fine, D˜ = b(h˜− a(k))+, and h˜ is the height of the run up, where
(h− a)+ =
{
h− a if h > a
0 otherwise.
This implies no damage cost for h ≤ a(k).
The operator’s payoff function takes the form
P˜O = T − ϕ(k)− δfb(h˜− a(k))+. (4.2)
The expected payoff of the operator takes the form
E[P˜O] = T − ϕ(k)− δfbE[(h˜− a(k)+], (4.3)
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where
E[(h˜− a)+] =
∫ ∞
a
(h− a)f(h)dh,
and f(h) as the probability distribution of run up heights.
The operator’s optimization problem is the optimal choice of the safety design
parameter k ≥ 0, which takes the form
max(k≥0)
(
T − ϕ(k)− δfb
∫ ∞
a(k)
(h− a(k))f(h)dh
)
. (4.4a)
This objective function is strictly concave and differentiable, whenever ϕ′(k) > 0,
ϕ′′(k) ≤ 0, and a′(k) > 0, a′′(k) ≤ 0.
The unique solution k∗ is obtained from the first order condition (FOC), which is
given by
Prob(h˜ ≥ a∗) = ϕ
′(k∗)
δfba′(k∗)
, (4.4b)
where
a∗ = a∗(k).
Analysing FOC we can see that k∗ exists and is unique because the left hand side
of the FOC is decreasing in k and the right hand side of the FOC is increasing in k, as
well as assuming that ϕ′(0) = 0 and a(0) = 0.
The optimal safety design parameter k∗ is a function of δf , and independent of T
such that
k∗ = k∗(δf ).
It follows from the FOC that k∗ is increasing in δf .
Regulator’s decision problem is the choice of a transfer payment T and the fine
parameter δf that maximizes the expected payoff of the regulator such that
max(T,δf )E[P˜R(T, δf )].
We assume that the participation constraint of the operator is
E[P˜O(T, δf )] ≥ p0,
where p0 may be thought of as either a mark up or the operator’s assets that she could
sell in order to meet her payment obligations.
This expression must hold with equality at an optimal T ∗ and δ∗f if it is binding.
The reason is that if the participation constraint were not binding E[P˜O(T, δf )] > p0,
then T could be lowered without violating the participation constraint because of the
linearity.
In light of this, the regulator proceeds in two steps.
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1. Because k∗(δf ) is increasing in δf , there is a one-to-one correspondence between
fines and safety design parameters. The regulator’s choice of δ∗f may therefore be
transformed to an equivalent problem which determines the optimal safety design
parameter k ≥ 0 from the regulator’s point of view. This optimization problem
is given by
max(k≥0)
(
S − ϕ(k)−
∫ ∞
a(k)
b(h− a(k))f(h)dh− (1− αR)p0
)
. (4.5a)
This objective function is strictly concave and differentiable, as long as ϕ′(k) > 0,
ϕ′′(k) ≤ 0 and a′(k) > 0, a′′(k) ≤ 0.
The solution to the regulator’s optimization problem (4.5a) is obtained from the
first-order condition which takes the form
Prob(h ≥ a∗∗) = ϕ
′(k∗∗)
ba′(k∗∗) , (4.5b)
where
a∗∗ = a(k∗∗).
Analysing (4.5b) we can see that k∗ exists and is unique because the left hand
side of (4.5b) is decreasing in k and the right hand side of (4.5b) is increasing in
k, and ϕ′(0) = 0 as well as a(0) = 0.
The solution k∗∗ is called the socially optimal safety design parameter.
A comparison of (4.4b) with (4.5b) shows that
k∗(1) = k∗∗.
Hence, when the regulator sets a δ∗f = 1, the operator will implement the socially
optimal k∗∗.
2. Because the optimal fine is δ∗f = 1, it is optimal for the operator to implement the
safety design parameter k∗∗ which corresponds to the sea defence a∗∗ = a(k∗∗).
As a∗∗ is independent of the transfer payment T , the regulator may set
T ∗ = ϕ(k∗∗) + E[D(h˜, a∗∗)] + p0. (4.6)
where ϕ(k∗∗) is the cost of implementing the social optimum k∗∗, E[D(h˜, a∗∗)] is
the expected fine and p0 is the mark up or the operator’s assets. The operator
accepts the first best transfer payment which is the minimum payment that sat-
isfies her participation constraint. This implies that the expected payoff of the
operator is
E[P˜O(T ∗, δ∗f )] = p0.
Because F˜ = δf D˜ where δf = 1, the payoff of the operator in case of a flooding
may be negative if the realization of the damage cost D(h˜, a∗∗) is higher than the
expected damage cost E[D(h˜, a∗∗)].
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Summarising, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1 The optimal regulatory policy under asymmetric information, risk neu-
trality and full liability is determined by the optimal fine δ∗f , the optimal payment
transfer T ∗ and the optimal safety design parameter k∗∗.
1. The regulator sets a fine equal to damage cost, that is, δ∗f = 1.
2. The operator finds it optimal to implement the socially optimal safety design pa-
rameter k∗∗ that solves (4.5a), so that
k∗∗ = k∗(1).
The socially optimal sea defence is implemented, that is
a∗∗ = a(k∗∗).
3. The optimal transfer payment T ∗ set by the regulator is equivalent to the sum of
the cost of implementing the safety design parameter, the expected fine and the
markup, so that
T ∗ = p0 + ϕ(k∗∗) + E[D(h˜, a∗∗)].
4. The random payoff of the operator in case of flooding is negative for some realiza-
tions of h that exceeds the optimal sea defence a∗∗. That is when the realization
of damage cost is higher than the sum of the expected damage cost and the value
of the operator’s assets.
P˜ ∗O(T
∗, 1) = p0 + E[D(h˜, a∗∗)]−D(h˜, a∗∗).
5. The random payoff of the society in case of flooding is protected from a negative
payoff if the realization of the damage cost does not exceed the operator’s payoff
plus the difference between the society’s revenue from sea defences and the transfer
payment.
P˜ ∗S(T
∗, 1) = S − T ∗ +min{p0 + E[D(h˜, a∗∗)]−D(h˜, a∗∗), 0}.
4.1.2 Example
General assumptions:
• the regulator cannot observe the safety design parameter that determines the
quality of the sea defence chosen by the operator,
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Table 4.1: Notation
Parameter Description Value
(1) (2) (3)
h˜ Tsunami run up random variable ln N (4.5, 0.89)
a0 Sea defence parameter a0 = 1.7
k Safety design parameter 0 ≤ k ≤ 7
c Marginal cost c = 0.3
δf Initial fine parameter δf = 0.75
b Cost parameter b = 200
T Transfer payment T = 200
S Society revenue from sea defences S = 300
β
Risk coefficient of the relative
β = 0.7
risk aversion (CRRA) function
αG
Government’s weight parameter
αG = 0.60over operator’s surplus
αR
Regulator’s weight parameter
αR = 0.80over operator’s surplus
p0 Value of operator’s assets or mark up p0 = 30
• the heights of the tsunami run up are lognormally distributed. Empirical obser-
vations of tsunamis on the coast of the Hawaiian Islands in 1946 and 1957, in
the Japanese coast (mainly along the sariku coast) in 1896, 1933, 1946,1960,1964
and 1968, and on the coast of the Kurile Island between 1896 1981 shows that
the spatial distribution of the tsunami run up heights is well characterised by the
lognormal distribution [23, 9], and
• the realization of damage cost D˜ is induced by h˜ and the safety design parameter
k. The conditional cumulative distribution function H(D˜, ai) first order stochas-
tically dominates the conditional cumulative distribution function H(D˜, aj), that
is H(tildeD, ai) ≥ H(D˜, aj) whenever ai ≤ aj . See Fig. 4.1.
Suppose that the relationship between the sea defence a and the safety design
parameter k is given by the linear function
a(k) = a0k.
The cost function is of the quadratic form
ϕ(k) = c2k
2.
Given that the fine parameter of the fine function is δf = 0.75, the operator chooses
a safety design parameter k∗ that maximizes her payoff function. An optimal solution
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Figure 4.1: First-Order stochastic dominance of five cumulative density functions con-
ditional on the height of the sea defence.
to the optimization problem is
k∗(0.75) = 4.300.
This implies that the sea defence will have a height of
a∗ = a0k∗(0.75) = 7.310 m .
The optimal safety design parameter satisfies the incentive constraint of the oper-
ator.
Given that the optimal sea defence chosen by the operator is a∗ = 7.310 m, the
regulator’s decision problem is to choose (1) an fine parameter δf that induces the
operator to implement the height of the sea defence that maximizes the regulator’s
payoff function and (2) a minimum transfer payment T that satisfies the participation
constraint of the operator.
The optimal safety design parameter of the regulator is presented in Fig. 4.2 where
the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence implemented by the operator and
the y-axis represents the payoff of the regulator.
The numerical solution in Fig. 4.2 shows that the regulator chooses a safety design
parameter that is
k∗∗ = 4.385.
This implies that the sea defence will have a height of
a0k
∗∗ = 7.455 m .
We note that the operator finds it optimal to implement a sea defence below the
social optimum. In order to incentivize the operator to implement the socially optimal
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Figure 4.2: Regulator’s optimal sea defence under full liability.
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Figure 4.3: Operator’s optimal sea defence under full liability.
sea defence, the fine parameter δf is raised to 1, such that
k∗∗ = k∗(1) = 4.385,
a∗∗ = a0k∗∗ = 7.455 m .
The optimal choice of the safety design parameter of the operator when δf = 1 is
presented in Fig 4.3 where the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence imple-
mented by the operator and the y-axis represents the payoff of the operator.
Given that the regulator has set a fine equal to damage cost, the optimal transfer
payment to the operator has to guarantee that the expected payoff of the operator is
at least as large as p0. The numerical solution is presented in Fig. 4.4 where the x-axis
represents the height of the sea defence implemented by the operator and the y-axis
represents the transfer payment to the operator.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal transfer payment under full liability.
The numerical solution in Fig. 4.4 shows that the regulator chooses a transfer
payment of
T ∗ = 33.25 millione,
that is the minimum amount of money that the operator will accept to take on the
construction of the sea defence.
4.1.3 Dynamic setting: ratchet effect
This section attempts to discuss the ratchet effect in dynamic settings under moral
hazard.
Let’s suppose that the operator works in two different periods, 1 and 2, implement-
ing safety design parameter, k1 and k2, respectively.
As usual, the safety design parameter k is not observed by the regulator, the regu-
lator can only observe the stochastic damage cost output
D˜ = b(h˜j − a(kj)), j = 1, 2,
h˜ is assumed to be lognormally distributed and j is the time period.
The contract in period one will have the standard form
Tj − δfb(h˜j − a(kj)), j = 1, 2,
where Tj is the transfer payment and δfb(h˜j−a(kj)) is the fine imposed to the operator
at period j.
Since the operator is performing the same task over two periods, it is reasonable to
assume that the performance in period 1 is positively correlated with the performance
in period 2. Therefore, the regulator may use the stochastic damage cost output in
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period 1 to estimate the stochastic damage cost output in period 2 and set the contract
accordingly.
Let hˆ2 = ψ + φb(h˜1 − a(k1)) be the estimate of h˜2. The regulator can use this to
create an adjusted estimate of D˜2
Dˆ2 = D˜2 − hˆ2 = b(h˜2 − a(k2))− hˆ2.
The informativeness principle says that if the correlation between h1 and h2 is high
the output from period one should be used in the contract for period 2.
If the second period has the same form as the first-period contract, then the agent’s
total wage will be
[T1 − δ1b(h˜1 − a(k1))] + [T2 − δ2(b(h˜2 − a(k2))− ψ − φb(h˜1 − a(k1))))].
This can be rewritten as
T1 + T2 + (δ1 − ψδ2)(b(h˜1 − a(k1)) + δ2b(h˜2 − a(k2)− φ).
It is worth noting that the coefficient on a(k1) is not δ1, but rather δ1 − ψδ2 < δ1.
Since the regulator uses previous damage cost output to judge how to compensate
the operator for the safety design parameter implemented, this will mean that the
standard by which damage cost is evaluated in period two goes down by ψ.
This in turn reduces the incentive to implement a good level of safety design in the
initial period, as the operator anticipates this effect.
Hence we can define the effective incentives for the operator as δE1 = δ1 − ψδ2 and
δE2 = δ2.
In line with this, is it possible to design a contract which maximises total wealth
and achieve the first best safety design parameter? This is equivalent to the regulator
being able to commit himself to setting the contractual terms in both period 1 and 2
before the relationship begins.
The regulator will optimize its payoff function to the usual incentive constraints
(marginal cost equal to marginal benefit). If there is an optimal level of a(k1) and
a(k2), it must be such that a(k1) = a(k2) and δE1 = δE2 .
The absence of commitment power from the part of the regulator leads to a distor-
tion of incentives to the operator in that a(k2) > a(k1).
4.2 Risk neutrality and limited liability
As we have seen in the previous scenario, the fine imposed to the operator is propor-
tional to the expected damage cost. However, the extent of the damage that could
be realized upon the natural hazard could be extremely high, thus bankrupting the
operator.
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It follows from Theorem 1 that in an optimum
P˜O = p0 + E[D(h˜, a(k∗))]−D(h˜, a(k∗)) < 0
for all sufficient large run-up heights h˜, the realization of the fine will result in negative
payoffs for the operator.
Society can not be interested in bankrupt operators because they will bear all excess
cost. It is better to take into account bankruptcies by including a liability constraint.
This liability constraint guarantees a non-negative payoff of the operator for every
potential realization of the damage cost.
The liability constraint takes the form of a cap on the operator’s fine for any po-
tential realization of the damage cost.
In order to cap the operator’s fine, we assume that
P˜O =
{
T − ϕ(k)− F˜ if F˜ < F¯
T − ϕ(k)− F¯ otherwise.
4.2.1 Optimal risk regulatory policy under limited liability
Let F˜ = min{D˜, D¯} and as before, D˜ = b(h˜ − a(k))+ where h˜ is the height of the
run up. Then, the operator is fined up to the cap D¯; beyond that point the society
will bear this risk of flooding. This residual risk of damage incurring costs above D¯
has possibly a very low probability but may have severe economic consequences. In
engineering projects, a typical residual risk is less than 1%.
The operator’s payoff function is now
P˜O = T − ϕ(k)−min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}, (4.7)
where, as before,
(h− a)+ =
{
h− a if h > a
0 otherwise.
This indicates that the operator’s payoff is capped to non-negative values.
The operator’s expected payoff is
E[P˜O] = T − ϕ(k)− E[min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}], (4.8)
with
E[min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}] =
∫ a(k)+ D¯
b
a(k)
b(h− a(k))+f(h)dh+ D¯
∫ ∞
a(k)+ D¯
b
f(h)dh.
In light of this, the operator’s optimization problem is the choice of the safety design
parameter k ≥ 0 and takes the form
max(k≥0)
(
T − ϕ(k)−
∫ ∞
a(k)
min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}f(h)dh
)
. (4.9a)
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This objective function is strictly concave and differentiable, ϕ′(k) > 0, ϕ′′(k) ≤ 0
and a′(k) > 0, a′′(k) ≤ 0.
The solution is obtained from the first-order condition (FOC) for an optimal k
which takes the form
Prob(a∗ll ≤ h˜ ≤ a∗ll +
D¯
b
) = ϕ
′(k∗ll)
ba′(k∗ll)
, (4.9b)
where
a∗ll = a(k∗ll).
Thus, an optimal safety design parameter under limited liability (ll) is a function
of D¯, such that
k∗ll = k∗ll(D¯).
Under limited liability, we now require that
P˜O ≥ p0 (Participation constraint), (4.10)
where p0 is the value of assets that the operator is able to use to cover excess damage
cost.
If k∗ll is implemented then
P˜O
∗(T, D¯) = T − ϕ(k∗ll)−min{b(h˜− a(k∗ll))+, D¯} for all h˜.
Observe that
P˜O
∗(T, D¯) ≥ T − ϕ(k∗ll)− D¯
so that the limited liability constraint is satisfied whenever
T ≥ T ∗ll = ϕ(k∗ll) + D¯ + p0.
Observe that T ∗ll is the minimum transfer payment that satisfies the operator’s
participation constraint which because of k∗ll = k∗ll(D¯) is a function of D¯.
Setting T = T ∗ll , the expected payoff becomes a function of D¯ and given by
E[P˜O
∗] = D¯ − E[min{b(h˜− a∗ll)+, D¯}] + p0.
We may define the liability rent R(D¯) to be
R(D¯) = D¯ − E[min{b(h˜− a∗ll)+, D¯}] + p0,
where
a∗ll = a(k∗ll(D¯)).
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The regulator’s decision problem is the choice of the fine cap D¯ that maximizes the
expected payoff
E[P˜R(D¯)] = S−ϕ(k∗ll(D¯))−
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯))
b(h−a(k∗ll(D¯)))+f(h)dh− (1−αR)R(D¯). (4.11)
This objective function is strictly concave and differentiable whenever ϕ′(k) > 0,
ϕ′′(k) ≤ 0 and a′(k) > 0, a′′(k) ≤ 0.
The regulator’s maximization problem takes the form
max(D¯≥0)E[P˜R(D¯)]. (4.12a)
The solution of the regulator’s optimization problem is an optimal fine cap D¯∗∗ and
obtained from the first-order condition which takes the form
Prob(h˜ ≥ a∗∗ll )−
ϕ′(k∗∗ll )
ba′(k∗∗ll )
= (1−αR)
Prob(h ≤ a∗∗ll + D¯
∗∗
b )
ba′(k∗∗ll )
dk∗
ll
dD¯
(D¯∗∗)
+Prob(0 ≤ h˜− a∗∗ll ≤
D¯∗∗
b
),
(4.12b)
where
k∗∗ll = k∗ll(D¯∗∗) and a∗∗ll = a(k∗∗ll ).
k∗∗ll is the socially optimal safety design parameter and a∗∗ll is the optimal sea defence
under limited liability. Observe that both values k∗∗ll and a∗∗ll are also influenced by αR.
A comparison of (4.5b) and (4.12b) shows that the socially optimal safety design
parameter under limited liability is less than under full liability, that is
k∗∗ ≥ k∗∗ll .
This is because
(1− αR)
Prob(h ≤ a∗∗ll + D¯
∗∗
b )
ba′(k∗∗ll )
dk∗
ll
dD¯
(D¯∗∗)
+ Prob(0 ≤ h˜− a∗∗ll ≤
D¯∗∗
b
) ≥ 0
or, equivalently, the marginal liability rent is positive R′(D¯∗∗) > 0.
The optimal transfer payment is a function of D¯∗∗ and takes the form
T ∗ll = ϕ(k∗∗ll ) + D¯∗∗ + p0. (4.13)
This implies that the expected payoff of the operator is
E[P˜O(D¯∗∗)] = p0 + D¯∗∗ − E[min{b(h˜− a(k∗∗ll ))+, D¯∗∗}].
The regulator can no longer achieve the first best safety design parameter k∗∗ but
the second best transfer k∗∗ll that accounts for the fact that the operator will not be
able to cover losses above D¯∗∗.
Summarising, we obtain the following result.
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Theorem 2 The optimal regulatory policy under asymmetric information, risk neu-
trality and limited liability is determined by
1. The regulator sets an optimal maximum fine D¯∗∗.
2. The operator finds it optimal to implement the safety design parameter, that is
k∗ll(D¯∗∗) = k∗∗ll .
The optimal operator’s sea defence is implemented, that is
a∗∗ll = a(k∗∗ll ).
3. The optimal transfer set by the regulator is equivalent to the cost of exerting a
safety design parameter, the capped fine, and a markup.
T ∗ll = ϕ(k∗∗ll ) + D¯∗∗ + p0.
4. The random payoff of the operator under limited liability is protected from negative
payoff in case of flooding. This is because the fine is limited by a cap.
P˜ ∗O(T
∗
ll , D¯
∗∗) = p0 + D¯∗∗ −min{D(h˜, a∗∗ll ), D¯∗∗}.
5. The random payoff of the society under limited liability is negative for some real-
izations above the fine cap in case of flooding.
P˜ ∗S(T
∗
ll , D¯
∗∗) = S − T ∗ll −D(h˜, a∗∗ll ) +min{D(h˜, a∗∗ll ), D¯∗∗}.
4.2.2 Example
Given that the operator’s liability is constrained by an initial fine cap of D¯ = 100 millione,
the operator chooses a safety design parameter k that maximizes her payoff function
and minimizes his cost function ϕ(a(k)), that is
k∗ll(100) = 4.260.
This implies that the operator will implement a height of the sea defence, that is
a0k
∗
ll(100) = 7.243 m.
The optimal k∗ll(100) satisfies the incentive constraint of the operator, that is when
the marginal cost equalizes the marginal benefit.
The decision problem of the regulator is to choose a fine cap D¯ that maximizes
its payoff and minimizes the liability rent of the operator. The optimal fine cap D¯∗∗
induces the operator to implement a sea defence that is socially optimal. The second
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Figure 4.5: Optimal fine cap under limited liability.
.
decision problem of the regulator is to choose a minimum transfer payment to the
operator that will satisfy the limited liability constrain of the operator.
An optimal solution to the optimization problem of the regulator is presented in Fig.
4.5 where the x-axis represents the fine cap in million euros and the y-axis represents
the expected payoff of the regulator.
Fig. 4.5 shows that when the operator chooses a safety design parameter k∗ll(100) =
4.260, the optimal cap that maximizes the regulator’s payoff is
D¯∗∗ = 296.4 millione.
Observe from Fig. 4.6 where the x-axis is the fine cap in million euros and the
y-axis is the operator’s optimal sea defence that is a function of the fine cap.
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Figure 4.6: Operator’s optimal sea defence induced by the optimal fine cap.
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Figure 4.7: Residual risk borne by the society corresponding to the implementation of
operator’s optimal sea defence under limited liability.
The numerical result from Fig. 4.6 shows that when the regulator imposes a fine
of D¯∗∗ = 296.4 millione to the regulator, the operator will choose a safety design
parameter, that is
k∗∗ll (296.4) = 4.371.
This implies that the operator will implement a height of the sea defence, that is
a∗∗ll = 7.432 m.
The residual risk when the operator implements a sea defence a∗∗ll is presented in
Fig. 4.7 where x-axis represents the height of the sea defence and the y-axis represents
the probability of run up height exceeding the sea defence.
By comparison, the residual risk associated with the implementation of a∗∗ll under
limited liability is higher than the residual risk when a∗∗ is implemented under full
liability
a∗∗ll = 7.432 m.⇒0.40% and a∗∗ = 7.455 m.⇒0.38% (Residual risk).
Under limited liability, the society pays a transfer payment as a function of D¯∗∗,
that is much higher than the transfer payment under full liability.
T ∗ll = 329.26 millione and T ∗ = 33.25 millione.
When the run up height exceeds the sea defence implemented by the operator, the
ex-post payoff of the society under full liability and limited liability is presented in Fig.
4.8 where the x-axis is the height of the run up above the sea defence and the y-axis is
the payoff of the society.
For any realization of the run up height exceeding the optimal sea defence (residual
risk) by less than 0.819 m , the society prefers the operator to be full liable for the
damage cost. Any other realization exceeding the optimal sea defence beyond 0.819 m
33
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Run up height above sea defence (h) (Meters)
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
Pa
yo
ff 
(M
illio
n E
uro
s)
Society's payoff in case of flooding
Society's payoff under full liability
Society's payoff under limited liability
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.
the society would rather have an operator with limited liability. The society is also
better protected from negative payoff under limited liability than under full liability.
4.3 Risk aversion and full liability
An operator with an averse attitude to risk will value certain payoff outputs over
uncertain ones. As a result of this, a risk averse operator will have a decreasing marginal
utility.
The preferences of a risk averse operator over the expected payoff can be represented
by a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable Bernoulli utility func-
tion. This thesis assumes that the operator’s preferences are represented by a Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. This implies that as the payoff in-
creases, the risk aversion of the stakeholder involved in the project remains constant.
Therefore, the operator will invest the same percentage of the payoff in sea defences.
This is also a convenient assumption in economic analysis when the tsunami run up
height random variable is lognormally distributed.
The Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)utility function
The Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function takes the form
u(W˜O) =
{ (W˜O)1−β
1−β if β > 0 β 6= 1
lnW˜O if β = 1,
where W˜O is the wealth position of the operator and β is the risk averse coefficient
which determines the curvature of the utility function reflecting the operator’s attitude
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towards risk.
A concave function has a positive first derivative
u′(WO) = W−βO > 0
and a negative second derivative.
u′′(WO) = −βW−β−1O < 0.
Despite the curvature of a function is contained in its second derivative. It is not
invariant to positive linear transformations of the utility function. Invariance to an
affine transformation is an essential property of the Von Neuman Morgansten utility
function. The Arrow and Pratt’s measure of risk-aversion is widely used instead because
it remains the same even after an affine transformation of the utility function.
The third and fourth derivatives of the CRRA utility function are
u′′′(WO) = β (β + 1)W−β−2O > 0
and
u′′′′(WO) = −β (β + 1) (β + 2)W−β−3O < 0.
Observe that stakeholders whose preferences are represented by a CRRA utility
function like positive skewness and dislike positive kurtosis.
The Arrow and Pratt’s measure of CRRA is to divide the second derivative
u′′(WO(T,D)) = βW−β−1O
by the first derivative
u′(WO) = W−βO .
However, this would give us a negative number as a risk-averse person’s measure.
As the utility funtion must be increasing with the payoff and must have a positive first
derivative because of the property of monotonicity, the sign is changed, so that a larger
number indicates a more risk-averse consumer.
Given this, the Arrow and Pratt’s measure of CRRA takes the form
β = −WO βW
−β−1
O
W−βO
. (4.14)
When β > 1, the utility level is bounded from above, but not below. Nonetheless,
when β < 1 the utility level is bounded below, but not above. In the logarithmic case,
when β = 1 the utility level is neither bounded above or below.
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4.3.1 Optimal risk regulatory policy risk aversion
In this case, a risk-averse operator is concerned about the expectation and the variance
of the payoff. When an operator is averse to risk, the utility of his payoff is larger that
expectation of the utility of his payoff.
u(E[W˜O]) > E[u(W˜O)].
The amount of money that yields the same utility that the expected utility of the
payoff is called certainty equivalent (CE), that is
u(CE) = E[u(W˜O)].
A CE makes the operator indifferent between a payoff with uncertainty and a
certain payment. CE can be defined as a sure money metric measure of utility and can
be formulated as
CE = u−1(E[u(W˜O)]).
In order to encourage the operator to bear some risk associated with the uncertainty
of the payoff, the operator has to receive a rent to compensate for the risk taken. We
may define this rent as the risk premium ρ that increases with D¯. The risk premium is
the minimum amount of money by which the expected payoff must exceed the payoff
without uncertainty in order to induce the operator to bear the risk of the project. The
risk premium is mathematically formulated as the expectation of the payoff minus the
certainty equivalent
ρ(W˜O) = E[W˜O]− CE(W˜O).
The participation constraint of the operator is defined as
E[u(W˜O)] ≥ u0 where u(p0) = u0
⇔ CE(W˜O) ≥ p0
⇔ E[W˜O]− ρ(W˜O) ≥ p0
⇔ E[W˜O] ≥ p0 + ρ(W˜O).
Therefore, in order to satisfy the participation constraint, the operator’s expected
payoff needs to be at least as large as the sum of the mark up and a risk premium.
As the CRRA utility function is infinitely often differentiable and defined in the
region near E[W˜O], the utility function u(W˜O) can be approximated by using a finite
number of terms of its Taylor series TM (W˜O, u).
u(WO) ' TM (WO, u).
This expression can be written in the more compact sigma notation as
TM (WO, u) =
M∑
m=1
um(E[W˜O])
m! (WO − E[W˜O])
m.
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The derivative of the function u(m)(E[W˜O]) is given by
u(m)(E[W˜O]) = (−β)mβ(β + 1)...(β +m− 1)E[W˜O]1−β−m, m = 0, 1, ...
Using the Taylor expansion of order M with respect to W˜O around E[W˜O]. The
expected utility takes the form
E[u(W˜O)] =
M∑
m=1
u(m)(E[W˜O])
m! E[(W˜O − E[W˜O])
m].
The total initial wealth position of the operator W˜O can be defined as
W˜O = (T − ϕ(k)− δfb(h˜− a(k))+ +A0)+,
where A0 is the assets of the operator before entering the project and guarantees that
the total initial wealth of the operator remains positive for any realization of h˜. T −
ϕ(k)− b(h˜− a(k))+ is the payoff of the operator and b(h˜− a(k))+ is the fine F˜ that is
equal to the damage cost F˜ = D˜. The height of the sea defence a is a function of k.
The expected wealth position of the operator E[W˜O] is
E[W˜O] =
∫ ∞
0
(T − ϕ(k)− δfb(h− a(k))+ +A0)+f(h)dh.
The operator’s optimization problem is the choice of the safety design parameter
k ≥ 0 that maximizes its expected utility.
max(k≥0)E[u(W˜O)].
A solution to the optimization problem is
k∗ra = k∗ra(δf ).
An optimal k∗ra induces a sea defence, that is
a∗ra = a(k∗ra).
In this setting, it is assumed that the society also has risk aversion to uncertain
payoffs. Thus, the utility of the regulator is presented as
u(W˜S , W˜O) = u(W˜S) + αRu(W˜O). (4.15)
The utility function of the society is the same as the operator’s CRRA function and
has the same risk coefficient
u(W˜S) =
(W˜S)1−β
1− β . (4.16)
As previously, using the Taylor expansion of order M with respect to W˜R around
E[W˜R]. The expected utility of the society takes the form
E[u(W˜S)] =
M∑
m=0
u(m)(E[W˜S ])
m! E[(W˜S − E[W˜S ])
m].
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The total initial wealth position of the society W˜S can be defined as
W˜S = S − T − (1− δf )b(h˜− a(k))+.
The expected wealth position of the society E[W˜S ] is
E[W˜S ] =
∫ hmax
0
S − T − (1− δf )b(h− a(k))+f(h)dh.
The regulator’s optimization problem is the choice of the fine parameter δf that
maximizes its expected utility.
max(T,δf )E[uR(W˜S , W˜O)].
The solution of the regulator’s optimization problem is an optimal cap δ∗f where
k∗∗ra = k∗∗ra(δ∗f ) and a∗∗ra = a(k∗∗ra(δ∗f )).
The regulator sets a transfer payment Tra for the operator, that is
T ∗ra = ϕ(k∗∗ra) + E[D(h˜, ara∗∗)] + p0 + ρ(W˜O), (4.17)
where ϕ(k∗∗ra) is the cost of implementing the social optimum k∗∗ra, E[D(h˜, a∗∗)] is the
expected fine and p0 is the mark up or the operator’s assets and ρ(W˜O) is the risk
premium. The operator accepts the second best transfer payment which is the minimum
payment that satisfies her participation constraint. This implies that the expected
payoff of the operator is
E[W˜O(T ∗ra, δ∗f )] = p0 + ρ(W˜O).
Summarising, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3 The optimal regulatory policy under asymmetric information, risk neu-
trality and full liability is determined by the optimal fine δ∗f , the optimal payment
transfer T ∗, and the optimal safety design parameter k∗∗.
1. The regulator sets a fine equal to damage cost, that is δ∗f = 1.
2. The operator finds it optimal to implement the socially optimal safety design pa-
rameter k∗∗, so that
k∗∗ra = k∗ra(1).
The socially optimal sea defence is implemented, that is
a∗∗ra = ara(k∗∗).
3. The optimal transfer payment T ∗ set by the regulator is equivalent to the sum of
the cost of implementing the safety design parameter, the expected fine and the
markup, so that
T ∗ra = ϕ(k∗∗ra) + E[D(h˜, a∗∗ra)] + p0 + ρ(W˜O(h˜, a∗∗ra)). (4.18)
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4.3.2 Example
The decision problem of the operator is to choose a safety design parameter k∗ that
maximizes her utility function and minimizes the cost of implementing the sea defence.
In this setting, it is assumed that society and the operator share the same risk averse
coefficient, that is β = 0.7. An optimal solution to the optimization problem of the
operator is presented in Fig.4.9 where the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence
implemented by the operator and the y-axis represents the expected utility of the
operator.
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Figure 4.9: Operator’s optimal sea defence under risk aversion when δf = 1.
Given that δf = 1, Fig. 4.9 shows that the operator will choose a safety design
parameter, that is
k∗ra(δf ) = 5.160.
This implies that the sea defence will have a height of
a∗ra = a0k∗ra(δf ) = 8.772 m .
The optimal sea defence satisfies the incentive constraint of the operator.
By comparing the optimal choice of the safety design parameter of the operator
under risk aversion and under risk neutrality, we observe that the decreasing marginal
utility of the damage cost enhances the strength of the incentive inducing the operator
to implement a higher sea defence to make up for the loss of payoff. This is presented
in Fig. 4.10.
Given that the optimal sea defence chosen by the operator is a∗ra = 7.310 m, the
regulator’s decision problem is to choose (1) an fine parameter δf that induces the
operator to implement the height of the sea defence that is socially optimum and (2) a
minimum transfer payment Tra that satisfies the participation of the operator.
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Figure 4.10: Optimal sea defence of a risk averse and a risk neutral operator.
The optimal safety design parameter of the regulator is presented in Fig. 4.11 where
the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence implemented by the operator and
the y-axis represents the payoff of the regulator.
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Figure 4.11: Optimal sea defence of a risk averse operator and the risk averse regulator.
Observe that the optimal choice of the safety design parameter of the regulator is
the same as the operator’s optimal sea defence, that is
k∗∗ra = k∗ra = 5.160.
Therefore, following the linear relationship between the safety design parameter and
the height of the sea defence the operator will implement a height of the sea defence,
that is
a0k
∗∗
ra = a0k∗ra = 8.772 m .
40
This numerical result implies that the regulator chooses a fine parameter δf = 1
under the assumption that the society’s and the operator’s preference are represented
by a power utility function.
The implementation of a sea defence of a height of a∗ra = 8.772 m considerably
reduces the residual risk of the engineering project compared to the risk neutrality
case. The residual risk in the risk averse case is presented in Fig. 4.12 where the x-axis
represents the height of the sea defence and the y-axis represents the probability that
the run up will exceed the sea defence.
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Figure 4.12: Residual risk under risk aversion.
Fig.12 indicates that the residual risk under risk aversion is much lower than under
risk neutrality
a∗∗ra = 8.772 m.⇒0.002% and a∗∗ = 7.455 m.⇒0.38% (Residual risk).
A low residual risk also implies a higher cost to the society. Given that the regulator
has set a fine equal to damage cost, the optimal transfer payment to the operator has
to guarantee that the expected payoff of the operator is at least as large as the risk
premium ρ(W˜O) and the mark up p0. The numerical solution is presented in Fig. 4.16
where the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence implemented by the operator
and the y-axis represents the transfer payment in million euros to the operator.
The numerical solution in Fig. 4.16 shows that the regulator under risk aversion
chooses a transfer payment, that is
T ∗ra = 34.17 millione.
Note that the transfer payment under risk aversion is approximate the transfer payment
under risk neutrality as shown in Fig 6
T ∗ra ≈ T ∗ = 33.25 millione.
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Figure 4.13: Optimal transfer payment under risk aversion when δf = 1.
Similar to the risk neutrality case, the transfer payment T ∗ra is the minimum amount
of money that the operator will accept to take on the construction of the sea defence.
42
Chapter 5
Delegation regulatory policy
Let us consider a pro-operator regulator who is better informed than the government
with regard to the damage cost in case of flooding. Due to this informational asymmetry
the regulator can manipulate the cost parameter in the damage cost function to benefit
the operator at the expense of the society. In order to remove this incentive, the
government can either impose a fixed transfer payment or restrict the range of payments
that the regulator can transfer to the operator.
5.1 No discretion - rigid policy
In this case, a regulator is not granted any authority and the government sets a cap of
the fine D¯ that determines the transfer payment to the operator T (D¯) . We assume
that the society and the operator have a neutral attitude to risk and that the operator
has limited liability.
Let F˜ = min{D˜, D¯} and D˜ = b(h˜ − a(k))+. As before, h˜ is the height of the run
up but the operator is fined only up to an upper bound D¯ and a(k) is the height of the
sea defence built by the operator. The cost parameter b is common knowledge for the
regulator and the operator but not for the government.
The operator’s payoff function is again
P˜O = T − ϕ(k)−min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}. (5.1)
The operator’s expected payoff is
E[P˜O] = T − ϕ(k)− E[min{b(h˜− a(k))+, D¯}]. (5.2)
In light of this, the operator’s optimization problem is the choice of the safety design
parameter k ≥ 0 and takes the form
max(k≥0)
(
T − ϕ(k)−
∫ ∞
a(k)
min{b(h˜− a(k)), D¯}f(h)dh
)
. (5.3a)
The solution is obtained from the first order condition for an optimal k∗ll which takes
the form
Prob(a∗ll ≤ h˜ ≤ a∗ll +
D¯
b
) = ϕ
′(k∗ll)
ba′(k∗ll)
, (5.3b)
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where
a∗ll = a(k∗ll).
Thus, an operator’s optimal safety design parameter under a rigid rule is a function
of D¯, such that
k∗ll = k∗ll(D¯).
We again require that
P˜O ≥ p0 (Participation constraint), (5.4)
where p0 is the value of assets that the operator is able to use to cover excess damage
cost. If k∗ll is implemented then
PO(T, D¯) = T − ϕ(k∗ll)−min{b(h˜− a∗ll)+, D¯} for all h˜.
Observe that
PO(T, D¯) ≥ T − ϕ(k∗ll)− D¯,
so that the limited liability constraint is satisfied whenever
T ≥ T ∗ll = ϕ(k∗ll) + D¯ + p0.
Observe that T ∗ll is the minimum transfer payment that satisfies the operator’s
participation constraint because k∗ll is a function of D¯.
This implies that the expected payoff of the operator is
E[P˜O(T ∗ll , D¯)] = p0 + D¯ − E[min{b˜(h˜− a∗ll)+, D¯}].
The government does not observe the true cost parameter b. Therefore, it models
the uncertain cost parameter as a random variable b˜ taking values in the interval [b, b¯]
and distributed according to a probability distribution function g(b). The government’s
expected payoff is
E[P˜G(k, D¯)] = S − ϕ(k)− E[b˜(h˜− a(k))+]− (1− αP )E[R(k, D¯)], (5.5)
with
E[b˜(h˜− a)+] =
∫ b¯
b
∫ ∞
a(k)
b(h− a(k))g(b)f(h)dbdh
and
E[R(k, D¯)] = D¯ −
∫ b¯
b
∫ ∞
a(k)
min{b˜(h˜− a(k)), D¯}g(b)f(h)dbdh+ p0.
Taking into account the optimal response of the operator, the government’s expected
payoff takes the form
E[P˜G] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯))−
∫ b¯
b
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯))
b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯))g(b)f(h)dhdb
− (1− αG)
[
D¯ −
∫ b¯
b
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯))
min{b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯)), D¯}g(b)f(h)dhdb+ p0
]
. (5.6)
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The government’s decision problem for the rigid rule is now the choice of the fine
cap D¯ that maximizes the expected payoff
max(D¯)E[PG(k∗ll(D¯), D¯)]. (5.7)
The solution of the government’s optimization problem is an optimal fine cap D¯∗rig,
where
k∗rig = k∗rig(D¯∗rig) and a∗rig(k∗rig).
k∗rig is the socially optimal safety design parameter and a∗rig is the optimal sea
defence under the rigid rule with limited liability for the operator. Observe that both
values k∗rig and a∗rig are influenced by the government’s weight αG which reflects the
importance that the government attaches to the operator’s payoff. The optimal transfer
payment is a function of D¯∗rig and takes the form
T ∗rig = ϕ(k∗rig) + D¯∗rig + p0. (5.8)
This implies that the expected payoff of the operator is
E[P˜O(D¯∗rig)] = p0 + D¯∗rig − E[min{b(h˜− a(k∗rig))+, D¯∗rig}].
Under a rigid policy, the regulator will be left without discretion to use its bias
or its expert information. The benefit of this rigid policy is that the rent/efficiency
trade-off is evaluated in line with the government’s choice of the fine cap.
Summarising, we obtain the following results
Theorem 4 The non-discretionary policy corresponds to the ex ante rule that would
be chosen by the parliament without any expert information and is determined by the
parliament’s optimal fine cap D¯∗rig, the optimal payment transfer T ∗rig, and the optimal
safety design parameter k∗rig(D¯∗rig).
1. The parliament sets a fine cap D¯∗rig.
2. The operator finds optimal to implement the safety design parameter, that is
k∗rig = k∗rig(D¯∗rig).
The optimal parliament’s sea defence is implemented, that is
a∗rig = a(k∗rig).
3. The optimal transfer is set by the parliament is the sum of the cost of implementing
the optimal safety design parameter, the optimal cap of the fine, and the markup.
T ∗rig = ϕ(k∗rig(D¯∗rig)) + D¯∗rig + p0.
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5.1.1 Example
The government’s decision problem of setting a cap to the operator’s fine D¯ is presented
in Fig. 5.1 where the x-axis represents the cap on the operator’s fine in million euros
and the y-axis represents the expected payoff of the government.
The cap of the fine that maximizes the government’s payoff in this convex optimiza-
tion numerical example is
D¯∗rig = 279.6 millione.
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Figure 5.1: Government’s optimal cap of the fine under a rigid rule.
.
The operator’s reaction to the optimal cap D¯∗rig = 279.6 millione imposed by the
government is to choose a safety design parameter that maximizes her expected payoff
as shown in Fig 5.2 where the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence and the
y-axis represents the expected payoff of the operator.
Fig 5.2 shows that the optimal safety design parameter chosen by the operator in
this numerical example is
k∗rig(279.6) = 4.357.
A safety design parameter k∗rig corresponds to the a height of the sea defence, that is
a∗rig(279.6) = 7.408 m.
By comparing the optimal choice of the height of the sea defence of the operator
in Fig 5.2 and the optimal choice of the height of the sea defence of the government
in Fig 5.3 where the x-axis represents the height of the sea defence and the y-axis the
expected payoff of the government, we observe that the optimal choice of the operator
is lower than the optimal choice of the government, that is
Operator : a∗rig = 7.408 m < Government : a∗rig = 7.596 m.
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Figure 5.2: Operator’s optimal sea defence induced by the government’s fine cap.
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Figure 5.3: Government’s optimal sea defence.
.
The implementation of a sea defence of 7.408 m height leaves some residual risk.
The probability that the run up height will exceed a sea defence of 7.408 m is shown
in Fig 5.4.
By comparison, the residual risk associated with the implementation of the sea
defence a∗rig under a rigid rule is higher than the residual risk when the sea defence a∗∗ll
is implemented under limited liability, that is
a∗rig = 7.408 m.⇒0.42% and a∗∗ll = 7.432 m.⇒0.40% (Residual risk).
As we decrease the residual risk, the cost to the society increases. This is because
the transfer payment increases with the cap of the fine T (D¯∗rig) and the residual risk
decreases as the fine cap increases.
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Figure 5.4: Residual risk under a rigid rule.
.
The transfer payment is a function of the fine cap. Under a rigid rule, the society
pays a higher transfer payment than under limited liability liability. This is because
the difference between αG and αR outweigh the difference between the expectation of
the cost parameter b˜ and the true value of the cost parameter b.
T ∗rig(D¯∗rig) = 317.83 millione and T ∗ll = 329.26 millione.
5.2 Limited discretion to the regulator
In this case, the government restricts the range of payments that the regulator can
transfer to the operator. As in the previous case, we assume that the society and the
operator have a neutral attitude to risk and that the operator has limited liability.
The regulator’s expected payoff is
E[P˜R(k∗ll(D¯reg), D¯reg)] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯reg))− E[b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯reg)))+]−
(1− αR)R(k∗ll(D¯reg), D¯reg) (5.9)
where the expected damage cost is
E[b(h˜− a(k∗llD¯reg))+] =
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯reg))
b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯reg)))f(h)dh
and the liability rent is
R(k∗ll(D¯reg), D¯reg) = D¯reg −
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯reg))
min{b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯reg))), D¯reg}f(h)dh+ p0.
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Therefore, the regulator’s payoff function can we rewritten as
E[P˜R(k∗ll(D¯reg), D¯reg)] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯reg))−
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯reg))
b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯reg)))f(h)dh
− (1− αR)
[
D¯reg −
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯reg))
min{b(h− a(k∗ll(D¯reg))), D¯reg}f(h)dh+ p0
]
. (5.10)
The regulator’s decision problem is the choice of the fine cap that maximizes her
expected payoff. The regulator’s optimization problem takes the form
max(D¯reg≥0)[P˜R(D¯reg)]. (5.11)
The solution to the regulator’s optimization problem is an optimal fine cap D¯∗reg(b)
and is obtained from the first order condition which takes the form
Prob(h˜ ≥ a∗∗ll )−
ϕ′(k∗∗ll )
ba′(k∗∗ll )
= (1−αR)
Prob(h ≤ a∗∗ll +
D¯∗reg
b )
ba′(k∗∗ll )
∂k∗
ll
∂D¯∗reg
(b, D¯∗reg)
+Prob(0 ≤ h˜−a∗∗ll ≤
D¯∗reg
b
).
(5.12)
The socially optimal safety design parameter is k∗∗ll = k∗∗ll (D¯∗reg) and the optimal
sea defence is a∗∗ll = a(k∗∗ll ). Observe that the optimal fine cap D¯∗reg depends on the
cost parameter b. This implies that restricting the cost parameter the government also
restricts the cap of the fine and, consequently the transfer payment to the operator.
Incentive compatibility for truth telling
When the regulator finds more beneficial to announce a cost parameter bˆ that is equal
to the true value of the cost parameter b, the operator’s choice of the safety design
parameter k∗ll(D¯∗reg) = k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b)) can be regarded as incentive compatible because it
will achieve the highest payoff for the regulator. On the contrary, if the regulator has
incentives to manipulate the cost parameter in order to increase its payoff, the safety
design parameter k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b)) is not incentive compatible. The conditions for the safety
design parameter k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b)) to be an incentive compatible mechanism are the truth
telling condition and the monotonicity condition.
1. Truth telling condition
The choice of the safety design parameter k∗ll(D∗reg(bˆ)) induced by the regulator’s
announcement of the cost parameter bˆ yields the following payoff for the regulator
E[P˜R(bˆ, b)] = S−ϕ(k∗ll(D∗reg(bˆ)))−
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D∗reg(bˆ)))
b(h−a(k∗ll(D∗reg(bˆ))))+f(h)dh−
(1−αR)(D∗reg(bˆ)−
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D∗reg(bˆ)))
min{b(h˜−a(k∗ll(D∗reg(bˆ))), D∗reg(bˆ)}f(h)dh+p0).
(5.13)
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The incentive compatibility constraints that are necessary to induce truth telling
by the regulator can thus be written as
b ∈ argmaxbˆ∈BE[P˜R(bˆ, b)]. (5.14)
The first order necessary conditions for truth telling to be the regulator’s most
profitable choice is:
∂E[P˜R(b, b)]
∂bˆ
= 0, ∀b ∈ B.
This is clear an identity in b.
2. The monotonicity condition can be written as
dk∗ll(D∗reg(b))
dbˆ
≥ 0. (5.15)
The monotonicity condition implies that, as the cost parameter b increases, the
operator’s safety design parameter k∗ll(D∗reg(b)) weakly increases and thus almost
differentiable with, at any point of differentiability.
Given that the government’s expected payoff is a function of the cost parameter
announced by the regulator as shown in Eq. 5.17.
E[P˜G(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(bˆ)), D¯∗reg(bˆ))] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯∗reg))− E[b˜(h˜− a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg))+]
− (1− αG)R(k∗ll(D¯∗reg), D¯∗reg). (5.16)
Observe that when the regulator announces the true cost parameter bˆ = b, the optimal
safety design parameter k∗ll(D¯∗reg(bˆ)) is not incentive compatible. This is because the
first order condition of Eq. 5.18 with respect to the cost parameter that the regulator
can announce is greater than 0.
∂
∂bˆ
E[PG(k∗ll(D¯∗reg), D¯∗reg)]
∣∣∣∣
bˆ=b
> 0 (5.17)
This loss of efficiency is as result of the difference between the regulator’s weight
αR and the government’s weight αG allocated to the liability rent of the operator. This
difference is 4α = αR − αG > 0.
In order to account for the incentive of the regulator to announce a higher cost
parameter, the government can restrict the level of discretion of the regulator. This
restriction takes the form of a cap on the range of cost parameters that the regulator
can announce. The optimal cap of the cost parameter limits from above the number of
feasible height of sea defences that the regulator can induce the operator to implement
and, consequently the payments to be transferred to the operator.
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Characterization of the mechanism
As the transfer payment is a function of the fine cap and the fine cap depends on the
cost parameter b, the government must restrict the set of feasible transfer payments
available to the regulator by setting a cap b∗ and a floor b∗ on the cost parameter that
the regulator can announce bˆ.
More formally, the characterization of the restriction of possible cost parameters
takes the form
D¯∗reg(bˆ, b∗, b∗) =

D¯∗reg(b∗) bˆ ≤ b∗
D¯∗reg(bˆ) b∗ ≤ bˆ ≤ b∗
D¯∗reg(b∗) bˆ ≥ b∗.
(5.18)
By restricting the interval of the cost parameter bˆ, the government restricts the regu-
lator’s optimal fine cap to the interval D¯∗reg ∈ [D¯∗reg(b∗), D¯∗reg(b∗)]. Within the interval
b∗ ≤ bˆ ≤ b∗, however, the regulator has full discretion in setting up transfer payments
in accordance to its own announcement of the cost parameter bˆ.
By restricting the regulator’s response to D¯∗reg(bˆ, b∗, b∗), the government’s expected
payoff function takes the form
E[P˜G(k∗ll(D¯∗reg), D¯∗reg)] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯∗reg))−
E[b˜(h˜− a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg)))+]− (1− αG)E[R(k∗ll(D¯∗reg), D¯∗reg)], (5.19)
where D¯∗reg = D¯∗reg(bˆ, b∗, b∗).
However, as it shown in Eq. 5.19, it is not necessary to set a floor b∗ because the
regulator has only an incentive to overstate the cost parameter b.
Optimization problem of the government
Despite the government does not observe the true value of the cost parameter b, the
range of values that the cost parameter can take is common knowledge. The government
thus models the cost parameter as a random variable b˜ taking values in the interval
[b∗, b∗] and distributed according to a probability density function g(b).
Simplifying the notation, the government’s expected payoff is now
E[P˜G(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗))] = S − ϕ(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗)))−
E[b˜(h˜− a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗))))+]− (1− αG)E[R(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗)), D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗))], (5.20)
where the expected damage is of the form
E[b˜(h˜−a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗))))+] =
∫ b¯
b
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯∗reg(b˜,b∗)))
b(h−a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗)))g(b)f(h)dhdb
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and the liability rent is
E[R(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗)), D¯∗reg)] =∫ b¯
b
[
D¯∗reg(b, b∗)−
∫ ∞
a(k∗
ll
(D¯∗reg(b,b∗))
min{b(h˜−a(k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b, b∗))), D¯∗reg(b, b∗)}f(h)dh
]
g(b)db+p0.
The government’s decision problem for the limited discretion case is now the choice
of the cost parameter cap b∗ that maximizes its expected payoff
max(b∗)E[P˜G(D¯reg(b˜, b∗))]. (5.21)
The solution to the government’s optimization problem is an optimal cap of the cost
parameter b∗∗. Given the government’s optimal cap of the cost parameter b∗∗ and the
regulator’s announcement of bˆ, the optimal safety design parameter and the optimal
sea defence are
k∗ll = k∗ll(D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗∗)) and a∗ll = a(k∗ll).
Theorem 5 The optimal policy can be characterized as follows:
• The optimal fine cap D¯∗reg set by the regulator is not incentive compatible because
αR > αG.
• When D¯∗reg(αR, b) ≥ D¯∗rig , the regulator has no discretion and the government
forces the regulator to impose a cap fine D¯∗rig to the operator before the cost
parameter b is announced by the regulator. This is ex ante optimal from the
parliament’s viewpoint (Rigid rule).
• When D¯∗reg(αR, b) ≤ D¯∗rig, the regulator is given some authority to choose the fine
cap to impose on the operator but this authority will be restricted to some level
depending on how misaligned the objectives of the regulator and government are.
• The government restricts the fine cap D¯∗reg(αR, b∗∗) that the regulator can impose
on the operator to induce a height of the sea defence a∗ll(D¯∗reg(αR, b∗∗)), where
b∗∗(αR) ∈ (b∗, b∗) is the unique solution to
E[b(h˜− a∗ll(D¯∗reg(αR, b(αR))))|b ≥ b∗∗) =
ϕ′(a∗ll(D¯∗reg(αR, b∗∗(αR)))) + (1− αG)R′(a∗ll(D¯∗reg(αR, b∗∗(αR))))
where D¯∗reg(αR, b∗∗) ≤ D¯∗gov(αG, b¯).
5.2.1 Example
The government is facing an asymmetric information problem where it has not expe-
rience in understanding the value of the cost parameter b that determines the damage
cost output. However, the government has some primary knowledge which enables it
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to have some believes about the range of possible values of the cost parameter can take
[b∗, b∗]. The government attaches a probability to each possible value by randomizing
over the cost parameter b. In light of this, the cost parameter is modelled as a ran-
dom variable b˜. It is assumed that the random variable is normally distributed in the
interval [20, 700] with parameters (µ = 300, σ2 = 0.89).
The decision problem to the government starts by evaluating the optimal fine cap
in the interval of the cost parameter [b∗, b∗] that maximizes its payoff. The optimal cost
parameter b∗∗ will determine the level of discretion granted to the regulator in order
to impose a fine cap to the operator. This is because the fine cap D¯∗gov is a function of
b∗∗. This is presented in Figure 5.5 where the x-axis represents the fine cap in million
euros and the y-axis represents the government’s expected payoff in million euros.
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Figure 5.5: Government’s optimal fine cap when the government randomizes over the
cost parameter b˜.
Fig. 5.5 shows that the government’s optimal fine cap when randomizes over b is
D¯∗gov(b˜, b∗, b∗) = 279.6 millione.
The government’s optimal sea defence is presented in Fig. 5.6 where the x-axis
represents the height of the sea defence and the y-axis represents the government’s
expected payoff in million euros.
From Fig. 5.6 we can observe that the optimal height of the sea defence takes the
value of
k∗gov(b˜, b∗, b∗) = 4.468 and a∗gov = a(k∗gov) = 7.596 m .
The regulator has privilege information about the cost parameter b that determines the
damage cost outcome. Because of the difference in the regulator’s and government’s
weight parameter 4α = αR − αG > 0, the regulator has an incentive to overstate the
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Figure 5.6: Government’s optimal sea defence when the government randomizes over
the cost parameter b˜.
value of the cost parameter. How much the regulator wants to overstate the value of
the cost parameter depends on 4α. The value of the regulator’s weight parameter αR
is 0.80 and the value of the government’s weight parameter is αG is 0.60. These values
are common knowledge.
Given that the regulator announces a cost parameter b = 500, the regulator chooses
the fine cap that maximizes its expected payoff. The solution to the optimization
problem is presented in Fig. 5.7 where the x-axis represents the fine cap in million
euros and the y-axis represents the expected payoff of the regulator. .
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Figure 5.7: Regulator’s optimal fine cap when the regulator announces a cost parameter
b = 500.
As shown in Fig. 5.7, a solution to the regulator’s optimization is the choice of an
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optimal fine cap at
D¯∗reg(b˜, b∗, b∗) = 309.3 millione.
The regulator’s optimal sea defence is presented in Fig. 5.8 where the x-axis rep-
resents the height of the sea defence and the y-axis represents the regulator’s expected
payoff in million euros.
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Figure 5.8: Regulator’s optimal sea defence when the regulator’s announcement of
b = 500.
.
From Fig. 5.8, we can observe that the optimal height of the sea defence takes the
value of
k∗reg(b˜, b∗, b∗) = 4.510 and a∗reg = a(k∗reg) = 7.668 m .
By comparing Fig. 5.5 and 5.7 we note the government’s optimal fine cap is not
aligned with the regulator’s optimal fine cap. This implies that the regulator will induce
the operator to implement higher sea defences. This implies that the transfer payment
paid to the operator will also increase making the society bear higher costs. Taking
this into account, capping the cost parameter will enable to align the objectives of the
regulator and the government.
The government’s decision problem is to choose the cost parameter cap that will
aligned the regulator’s and the government’s objectives with respect to the fine cap to
impose to the operator. This is presented in Figure 5.9 where the x-axis represents the
cost parameter cap in million euros and the y-axis represents the optimal sea defence
of the regulator.
Given that the optimal cap of the cost parameter is b∗∗ = 365.2 millione, the regu-
lator’s discretion will be bounded in the interval [D∗reg(αR, b∗), D∗reg(αR, 365.2)]. When
the cost parameter announced by the regulator is higher than optimal cost parameter
cap b∗∗ = 365.2 millione, the fine cap that the regulator will impose to the operator
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Figure 5.9: Optimal cost parameter cap set by the Government.
is D∗reg(αR, 365.2). This fine cap is higher than D∗gov(αgov, 365.2). Nevertheless, as the
announcement of the cost parameter increases the fine cap chosen by the regulator gets
closer to the fine cap chosen by the government up to a certain threshold . After that
threshold the fine cap of the regulator will fall below the government’s choice of the
fine cap.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has shown that the provision of incentives in the form of a risk sharing
mechanism can be effective in order to achieve a desirable safety scenario under un-
certainty. In the more naive case where the society and the operator show a neutral
attitude to uncertain payoffs and the operator is full liable for the damage cost incurred
due to flooding, a first best sea defence (e.g., height of the sea defence) is implemented
by the operator. Using as an example the implementation of a sea defence, the first
best height of the sea defence has no informational cost for the regulator because it
can extract all the rents from the operator. The operator’s full liability implies that in
the case that a realization of the run up height exceeds the first best height of the sea
defence implemented by the operator, the operator will be financially responsible to
fully compensate for the damage cost. Taking into account that the economic damages
inflicted by natural hazards could reach 300 billion in the context of nuclear safety,
it is unreasonable to consider the full liability scenario. This has been proven in the
Fukushima nuclear accident where despite the operator claiming that she would be able
to provide full compensation for the damage cost in case of an accident, she has had
to be bailed out by the government because the damage cost exceeded by far her total
assets.
Bearing in mind the magnitude of the damage cost in nuclear accidents, it is more
realistic to assume that the liability of the operator to compensate is limited to some
extent. Limiting the responsibility of the operator in case of an accident has some
implications to the safety of the project and the cost to the society. Since the fine to be
imposed to the operator can not be equivalent to the damage cost as this will exceed
the assets of the operator, the strength of the incentive mechanism will decrease leading
to the implementation of a sea defence below the socially optimum. This second best
height of the sea defence involves an informational cost to the society in the form of a
liability rent to guarantee the participation of the operator in the engineering project.
The more we make the operator liable for the damage cost, the higher the liability rent.
The society faces a trade off between liability rent and residual risk. The higher the
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residual risk, the lower the liability rent.
The society demands that critical infrastructures such as chemical plants or nuclear
power plants to be safe. Nevertheless, if we want to implement protective measures
to account for the possibility of any possible rare event, most projects would be eco-
nomically non viable. This means that as the society demands higher levels of safety,
the liability rent left to the operator increases as an exchange of reducing the residual
risk. In line with this, the society is challenged with the following dilemma; how much
residual risk is the society willing to accept in light of the economic benefits arisen
from running nuclear power plants such as affordable electricity, low carbon emissions,
creation of jobs, etc...? The answer to this question can be translated into a trade off
problem between liability rent and residual risk.
This thesis also considers the case where the operator and the society have an averse
attitude to risk in the presence of uncertain payoffs. It has been shown that the risk
averse assumption has a beneficial impact to the performance of the operator. As a
risk averse operator is particularly concerned with the tale of the distribution of the
fine, the operator will increase the height of the sea defence to reduce the weight on
the upper extreme values of the tail. This is because the marginal fine decreases under
risk aversion. The rate at which the marginal fine decreases is determined by the risk
coefficient of the power utility function. A higher risk coefficient implies a higher sea
defence and therefore, a lower residual risk. However, the risk coefficient does not play
any role in the society payoff function as the fine and the damage cost functions cancel
each other out eliminating the random elements of the function. Similarly to the limited
liability case, the implementation of a second best height of the sea defence is not free
for the society. The society will have to compensate the operator for participating in
the project in the presence of uncertain payoffs. This compensation takes the form of a
risk premium and is subject to the risk coefficient and the variance of the damage cost
distribution.
Undoubtedly the risk sharing incentive mechanism has proven useful to reduce the
negative incentives in both the downstream and upstream moral hazard. In particular,
the regulator’s wrong incentives arising in the presence of regulatory capture can be
eliminated to enhance the implementation of protective measures in line with the safety
standards. Granting discretion to the regulator can bring benefits to the practicability
and efficiency of the project but once again, the existence of asymmetric information
between the regulator and the government with respect to certain parameters deter-
mining the damage cost makes this a non-trivial problem. As a consequence of this,
the government faces a trade off problem between how much discretion should be given
up and how much expert information should be used from the regulator. It has been
shown that granting authority to the regulator to decide the fine cap to impose on the
operator is not always recommended despite the benefits highlighted previously. In the
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case when the government observes that any of the fine cap choices available to the
regulator is higher than its ex-ante choice of the fine cap, no discretion will be granted
because the cost to the society outweighs the benefits of using the regulator’s exper-
tise. Nevertheless, when the government observes that some of the fine cap choices
available to the regulator are lower than its ex-ante choice of the fine cap some level of
discretion can be granted. The limit on the fine caps that the regulator can announce
is determined by how much the regulator is biased towards the interests of the nuclear
industry. When the regulator’s range of fine caps is optimally restricted, the objectives
of the regulator and the operator will be aligned by encouraging the regulator to choose
a fine cap that will not exceed the optimal fine cap of the government.
6.1 Future work
This thesis can be extended in several directions. In order to account for the limitation
of knowledge and understanding of how a nuclear accident relates to environmental
damage and the lack of accuracy of the methods to estimate environmental damage
cost (e.g., replacement cost methods), the regulator can model the damage cost using
imprecise probabilities where an upper and lower bound is set to the distribution of
damage cost output. In line with this, the assumption of global rationality has to be
relaxed in favour of a bounded rationality assumption. This implies that the contract
cannot be complete any longer. Under incomplete contracts, the operator will react to
this contract by implementing a sea defence that may not be optimal necessarily but
which provides a good practical solution.
Another area of work is to include more dimensions in the model by adding more
complex safety design parameters and establishing technical relationships between them
for a complete specification of the engineering problem. Because of the complexity of
the parameters and their level of uncertainty, this research can adopt agent-based mod-
elling. Agent-based models (ABMs) are useful to reproduce many systems related to
economics and social sciences, where the structure can be designed through a network.
ABMs consist of a set of elements (agents), characterized by some attributes, which
interact with each other through the definition of appropriate rules in a given environ-
ment. Typically, the agent behaviour rules, attributes and the environment are setup
using empirical data or theory. Broadly, ABMs can be used first, to explore and explain
the mechanism of a theory of individual behaviour on the whole system, or second, to
describe and forecast the behaviour of a system, or third, in a participatory context to
explore a system and its behaviour with stakeholders.
A different research stream is to extend this model to a dynamic setting in order
to explore how the safety design parameters to be implemented change over time and
how the stochastic outcome is affected by this in view of the ratchet effect introduced
in section 4.1.3.
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